[This is an excerpt from an article in The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies. Opinions do not reflect the position of the editorial board.]

Why it matters: democratic backsliding by intimidation

TNR is best understood as a democratic harm because it alters behaviour in ways institutions rarely measure. It converts ordinary political acts into risk decisions.

First, TNR [transnational repression] produces a chilling effect. When people believe that speech, protest or community organising may trigger retaliation against relatives or networks abroad, self-censorship becomes rational. Dana Moss (Citation2016) shows how deterrence shapes diaspora activism and the strategies activists adopt to manage risk. Digital tools amplify that deterrence. Anstis and Barnett (Citation2022) argue that digital transnational repression is difficult to attribute and often combines online harassment with offline pressure, including coercion-by-proxy through threats to family members.

Second, TNR encourages proxy mobilisation inside host societies. Wong’s (Citation2024) analysis of ‘repressive nationalist diasporas’ shows how states can cultivate loyalist networks that harass critics, gather information and disrupt dissent in ways that blur state and non-state boundaries. Over time, communities can fracture into those who withdraw, those who organise quietly, and those who are publicly targeted, weakening the associational life on which democracy depends.

Third, TNR distorts institutions by pulling democracies towards securitised responses that can alienate the communities most in need of protection. Furstenberg (Citation2025) notes this tension in the European Union context: multilateral responses can drift towards threat narratives and expanded security powers, even when the goal is protection. A Commonwealth-wide strategy that emphasises deterrence while neglecting victim-centred support and oversight risks reproducing the core harm – treating diaspora political life as inherently suspect rather than as part of democratic participation.

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The cumulative effect is a subtle form of democratic backsliding. The state appears unable to guarantee equal civic safety; targeted groups withdraw; representation becomes distorted; and policing norms shift towards surveillance and control. Schenkkan (Citation2025) describes this broader moment as a ‘golden age’ of transnational repression, where more states have more tools to target exiles and diaspora communities across a widening set of host countries. For the Commonwealth as a self-declared values based association supporting democratic values and good governance, it tests whether democratic membership means equal protection in practice.

Implications: what should the Commonwealth do next?

The Commonwealth is not a military alliance and has limited coercive power. Its comparative advantage lies in standard-setting, peer learning, capacity support and democratic legitimacy. A credible response to TNR should therefore build a protection architecture that member states can implement at different levels of capacity – without turning ‘diaspora security’ into geopolitical theatre.

Standardise definition and reporting (country-blind)

The JCHR report stresses that the UK lacks a formal definition and does not routinely collect data on TNR, making scale hard to judge and responses hard to calibrate (JCHR, Citation2025). A Commonwealth-endorsed operational definition – explicitly behaviour-based and country-blind – would help victims recognise the phenomenon, help institutions classify incidents consistently, and help policymakers detect patterns across jurisdictions.

Put victim protection at the centre

Under-reporting is predictable when victims fear escalation or distrust authorities (JCHR, Citation2025). Siena Anstis and Sophie Barnett (Citation2022) emphasise host states’ protective obligations: accessible reporting routes, tailored digital security guidance, and support mechanisms that reduce vulnerability rather than shifting the burden of proof onto victims at the outset. For the Commonwealth, this implies a shared model of victim-facing infrastructure: clear referral pathways, diaspora liaison capacity, and civil-society partnerships that make reporting safer and more credible.

Treat security cooperation as a democracy-risk vector – with guardrails

Fiji’s experience shows why small states’ and Small Island Developing States’ (SIDS) policing agreements can generate controversy: they may diffuse methods and norms that are not anchored in liberal oversight (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Citation2024; Reuters, Citation2024). A Commonwealth guardrail framework could set minimum democratic conditions for external security cooperation: transparency of agreements, independent review of high-risk technologies (especially surveillance and biometrics), data-handling standards, and limits on embedded foreign personnel.

Harden legal and administrative systems against ‘lawful-looking’ coercion

TNR often exploits visa regimes, passports, travel restrictions, policing notices and criminal allegations that are difficult for targets to contest. Marcus Michaelsen and Kris Ruijgrok (Citation2024) argue that host-country institutions shape whether repression succeeds, because legal and political gaps can be exploited. Commonwealth legal cooperation could therefore focus on due process safeguards: training decision-makers to recognise politically motivated requests, strengthening evidentiary thresholds for sensitive international cooperation, and ensuring accessible legal support for targets caught in cross-border legal pressure.

Avoid stigmatising diaspora communities

Kennedy Chi-Pan Wong’s (Citation2024) account of proxy mobilisation and Saipira Furstenberg’s (Citation2025) analysis of securitisation point to a central political risk: counter-TNR policy can become a rationale for suspicion of migrants rather than protection of democratic participation. A country-blind approach must therefore include rights and oversight: transparent thresholds, independent review, anti-discrimination safeguards, and a clear separation between protecting victims and policing communities.

The Commonwealth cannot eliminate transnational repression, but it can reduce its effectiveness by making democratic participation safer, raising the costs of intimidation, and closing institutional pathways that coercion exploits.

Conclusion

The Commonwealth’s democratic mission is endangered not only by overt authoritarianism, but by cross border intimidation which quietly restructures civic life. The UK inquiry shows that TNR allegations can implicate a wide range of states, including Commonwealth members (JCHR, Citation2025). Canada’s experience shows that intimidation can reach into parliamentary life and can be linked to allegations of serious violence involving a fellow Commonwealth state (Global Affairs Canada, Citation2023, Citation2024; Reuters, Citation2025). Fiji’s case shows how small states and SIDS can face a different vulnerability: the diffusion of coercive capacity and norms through policing cooperation (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Citation2024; Reuters, Citation2024).

A Commonwealth strategy treating TNR only as something perpetrated by outsiders will fail the people most affected and erode the organisation’s credibility. The alternative is country-blind democratic protection: shared definitions and reporting, victim-centred support, hardened legal and administrative safeguards, and democratic guardrails on security cooperation. To foster a democratic Commonwealth, this is the minimum infrastructure required in a world where repression travels.

Douglas Ching-yin Pea is with the Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, UK.