Opinion Justin Trudeau’s legacy. Justin Trudeau at CHOGM 2015 in Malta. [photo: Commonwealth Secretariat]Justin Trudeau at CHOGM 2015 in Malta. [photo: Commonwealth Secretariat on Flickr]

[This is an excerpt from an article in The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies. Opinions expressed do not reflect the position of the Round Table editorial board.]

The Liberal party under Trudeau in 2015 offered a six-point plan that guided them throughout their time in office.Footnote1 One can see evidence that they truly hoped to improve the growth opportunities of the middle class, recraft democratic institutions, make good on Canada’s international commitments to climate change, renew Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples, and renew Canada’s position in the world, all while balancing the budget over the near term.

While some of these plans came to fruition, many fell by the wayside as ‘circumstances’ distracted the government from its agenda. The election of Donald Trump as president in the USA (twice), peak oil prices in 2014, the emergence of China as the world’s largest economy, the unexpected and massively disruptive Covid pandemic, the Russia–Ukraine war, and defections and departures of key staff and ministers all worked to push the government off its preferred course. A review of each declared priority offers insight into Trudeau’s potential legacy.

First, the government asserted the primacy of policy in support of the ‘middle class’. The government was able to implement a new child tax credit that more than halved child poverty, introduced CAN$10-a-day daycare in partnership with all but Alberta, and began to introduce both a national dental plan (with more than 2.7 million enrolled by the end of 2024) and a national pharmacare plan for diabetes and contraceptive drugs (in partnership with three provinces by the time of the election).Footnote2 One unremarked innovation was to introduce direct deposits to individuals, which simplified distribution and opened up new policy tools.

Nevertheless, the plight of the ‘middle class’ remained the rallying cry for all the main parties in the 2025 election, signalling that more is needed. One complicating factor was the decision late in the first mandate to expand immigration in response to requests from post-secondary institutions for more students and business for more temporary migrants. Quotas for permanent immigration, refugees, family reunification, students and temporary foreign workers all rose significantly after 2020. In 2021–24, more than 1.4 million individuals immigrated to Canada, a rate almost twice that of the recent past. Meanwhile, 3 million non-permanent residents, students and temporary foreign workers were admitted; by the autumn of 2024 there were more than 3 million non-permanent residents in Canada.Footnote3 The combination of higher demand for single-family homes outside inner cities during Covid and the rising demand for housing to support new residents, especially in Vancouver, the Toronto area and Ottawa, caused a sharp rise in house prices and rents, jeopardising housing affordability and undercutting much of the progress in helping the middle class. While the surge in immigration has stopped and population growth is slowing, the shortfall in housing will take time to ease, requiring a mix of new federal, provincial and municipal policies and programmes. The federal Housing Accelerator Program adopted in 2024 is one effort to encourage more infill and entry-level housing but it had not achieved much by the time of the election on 28 April 2025.

Second, democratic reforms stumbled at the first gate. The idea of moving from our first-past-the-post electoral system to some form of proportional representation failed to gel into a plan and was dropped in the first term. The process to appoint non-partisan senators nominated by an arms-length committee worked for a few years, but over time appointees began to resemble the more partisan outcomes of past governments. Overall confidence in our democratic norms was challenged first by disaffection during the Covid pandemic (which most significantly triggered a 32-day convoy protest and blockade in Ottawa) and then by controversies over foreign interference – especially in our electoral system. Court cases and commissions looked into both concerns, but parties and parliamentarians were unable to coalesce around any substantive response before the election.

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Third, Trudeau started his term with a visit to the Pearson Building, the headquarters for Global Affairs Canada, the country’s foreign ministry, where he declared ‘we’re back’ and got a standing ovation from the bureaucrats. That enthusiasm never really coalesced into a coherent foreign policy.Footnote4 While Canada increased foreign aid slightly and negotiated a number of small trade agreements (especially later in the government’s term), Canada’s international influence was modest. With one of the smallest outlays on the military in NATO, Canada is pressed to raise expenditure at least to 2% of GDP. Our relationships with China and India further complicated Trudeau’s agenda. In 2018, Canada arrested and held Meng Wanzhou, Chief Financial Officer of Huawei, in response to a request for extradition to face charges in the USA; China responded by arresting two Canadians in China on espionage charges.Footnote5 While this standoff wound down in 2021 with all three being released and repatriated, tensions remain, with Canada and China engaged in diplomatic and trade conflicts. Meanwhile, Trudeau released a bombshell in 2023 that India was involved in the murder of a Canadian Sikh nationalist in Vancouver; while the Modi government angrily denied this, the USA issued warrants on a number of Indian nationals for similar attempts to assassinate activists in the USA. Both India and Canada have expelled some consular staff and remain at loggerheads.Footnote6

Fourth, Trudeau and his government made major strides in implementing policies to deliver its commitments to climate change. This involved a two-track policy: first, the federal government sought buy-in from the oil provinces by committing to build (and ultimately purchase) the TMX pipeline to double export capacity through the port of Vancouver for Alberta and Saskatchewan oil; and second, it signed the Paris Agreement of 2015 and committed Canada to net zero by 2050 and a 30% reduction in Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions below 2005 levels by 2030.Footnote7 The Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act enshrined the goals and provided the authority to implement carbon pricing for consumers (with a corresponding rebate) and industrial emissions programmes with each of the provinces. While net emissions fell 13% between 2005 and 2023,Footnote8 consumers, politicians, some industries and a few provinces became increasingly disillusioned by the pricing mechanism. On his first day in office, Prime Minister Mark Carney eliminated the consumer carbon price with effect from 1 April 2025 (it was due to rise by CAN$15/tonne to CAN$90/tonne) but signalled he intends to continue with a climate policy through changes to the industrial carbon emissions programme.

Fifth, Trudeau definitely moved the dial on Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples. Canada’s Royal Commission on Indigenous Peoples had reported in 1996 but many of the recommendations remained to be implemented. Upon forming his government, the indigenous file became a top priority. Successive ministers worked to resolve outstanding land claims, to negotiate modern treaties for British Columbia (BC) and the Territories and to work with First Nations to improve their water systems and housing. In early 2016 the government commissioned a National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls that reported in 2019 on injustices in the policing and policy systems. The government also settled more than CAN$47 billion of class action lawsuits dealing with past injustices, including for Indian residential and day schools, for underfunding of on-reserve child welfare, for the 1960s Scoop and for unclean drinking water. In 2021 Parliament adopted the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) as policy for Canada.

The indigenous, trade and economic files intersected when the government responded to a Supreme Court ruling from 2004, which established that the federal government had a duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples on developments. The courts had left much of the process to evolve, and that was a major barrier to development. In 2019 a new Impact Assessment Act was signed into law, providing greater specificity on how to fulfill that duty.Footnote9 While the Act was contested by a number of provinces in the Supreme Court and its application in areas of provincial jurisdiction was ruled unconstitutional, those parts of the Act affecting federal matters continue and are showing some promise to accelerate decisions. While these efforts go a long way to redressing historical issues, future governments will need to do more to deliver on these long-term commitments to First Nations people.

Finally, the Liberal promise in 2015 to balance the budget by 2019–20 and to lower the federal debt-to-GDP to 27% was abandoned in the first term. Then Covid hit, and the federal government disbursed more than CAN$230 billion in direct support to households and businesses and more than CAN$170 billion in tax deferrals and liquidity.Footnote10 One result is that federal expenditures are up about 60% from 2019–20, annual deficits are higher (forecast CAN$48 billion in 2024–25) and federal debt reached 42% of GDP in 2024–25. None of the parties in the 2025 election offered a path to balance in the foreseeable future.

The main disappointment for many is that the Trudeau government largely ignored national economic competitiveness. The best one can say is we muddled through, more or less doing as well as most other countries.

Peter Phillips is a Distinguished University Professor Emeritus, Johnson Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy (JSGS), University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada.