[This is an excerpt from an article in The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies. Opinions expressed do not reflect the position of the Round Table editorial board.]

Trump’s second term reintroduces a familiar volatility into US diplomacy. The President’s disdain for multilateralism, combined with a transactional worldview, makes long-term policy planning difficult for most partners. India’s response is not to retreat, but to insulate. It pursues defence interoperability with the US – maintaining the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) frameworks – but continues to source critical equipment from Moscow (Singh, Citation2025), including S-400 missile systems (Times of India, Citation2025). It engages in I2U2 (with Israel, the UAE, and the US), the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness initiative.

This approach is not a recent invention. It has deep historical roots. India’s non-alignment under Nehru was not necessarily isolationist; it was a bid to preserve freedom of action amid Cold War polarisation. In the decades that followed, the principle evolved. The Gujral Doctrine emphasised neighbourhood diplomacy without reciprocity. The 1998 nuclear tests, while condemned in the West, were explained as acts of strategic necessity (YouTube, Citation2013). Even the 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal, often heralded as a pro-Western pivot, was framed domestically as a recognition of India’s unique status, not its alliance obligations (Jaspal, Citation2008). Today, Modi’s foreign policy builds on these traditions, but with a more assertive tone. It speaks of ‘Vishwa Mitra Bharat’ – India as a friend of the world – and of rebalancing not just power, but narratives (Citation2025).

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Indeed, India’s influence is not just material. It is epistemic. Through India Stack and Digital Public Infrastructure for Global Good, it is offering development models to countries looking for alternatives to Western aid conditionality and Chinese state capitalism (Zehnder, Citation2023). During the COVID-19 pandemic, its Vaccine Maitri programme delivered millions of doses across the Global South – not as charity, but as solidarity (Government of India, Citation2023). In climate diplomacy, it is advocating for a ‘just energy transition’ that recognises historical emissions and developmental rights (Srivastava & Wettengel, Citation2024). India is not just participating in global governance; it is trying to shape it in a pluralist, post-Westphalian way.

Through this, the India-US relationship remains special. The United States is India’s largest trading partner, a major source of capital and technology and home to a vast and influential Indian diaspora. Shared values of democracy, rule of law and open society – however, strained in both countries – continue to be the rhetorical baseline for engagement. President Joe Biden’s administration had spoken of democratic solidarity, but Trump’s return removes the moral framing and replaces it with a more cynical – but perhaps more manageable – form of diplomacy. For India, this might reduce friction. It is no secret that Delhi was uncomfortable with Western criticism on Kashmir, religious freedom and digital censorship. A Trumpian White House, less interested in human rights and more in the bottom line, presents fewer ideological complications.

Still, there are risks. In April 2025, Trump announced a reciprocal tariff rate of 26% on Indian imports, although he later suspended tariffs for all countries to 10%. Despite high hopes, India has not yet secured a tariff reduction. Visa policies for Indian citizens are becoming more stringent. Pressure to buy American, rather than co-develop, could re-emerge in defence talks. Moreover, unpredictability in American policy – on China, Iran, or the multilateral system – can disrupt India’s own delicate balancing acts. Strategic autonomy does not mean indifference. It requires constant calibration, especially when major partners are volatile.

Some observers might note with irony that India, once a critic of the post-war international order, is now among its more consistent defenders. But this too reflects evolution. India’s challenge to the global order is not nihilistic. It does not seek to dismantle institutions, but to democratise them. Its demand for United Nations Security Council reform, greater voice for the Global South in financial institutions and recognition of non-Western development paths speaks to a desire not for disruption, but for reordering. Trump’s return may make this task harder – but it also reinforces India’s argument that multipolarity is not a choice, but a necessity.

Joseph Black, War Studies Department, King’s College London and Women’s Studies Center, Chiang Mai University.