[This is an excerpt from an article in The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies.]

The [East Africa Community] EAC has the choice. Analysts, observers, promoters and member states need to either moderate their ambitions for economic and political integration or agree on effective reforms of the EAC institutions by strengthening the supranational bodies of the Secretariat, the Assembly and the Court of Justice. The EACJ seems to be the most emblematic community body on the question of which direction the EAC will take. It may be a sign of acceptance and trust in the regional institutions that the government in Kinshasa chose to file a case against Rwanda over their involvement in violent unrest in the eastern parts of DRC at the EACJ.Footnote12 For the first time, one Partner States sued another EAC member in Arusha and both governments allowed this to happen. Institutional architectures that align coherently with an intergovernmental sovereigntist cooperation agenda, such as the one of ASEAN, do not even provide for the option to sue your neighbour. However, the EACJ itself acknowledged that the ambitious integration agenda of the community requires a different logic of representation (EACJ, Citation2018, pp. 16–17). This is to avoid permanent bargaining and potential politicisation of the court’s positions. The EU tried to accommodate this risk by a larger court system, in which every member state appoints three judges. Of course, from a legalistic perspective, the nationality of the judges should not constrain their independence. However, the architecture of the court will still face reform pressures because of the political character of the formula for an appropriate national representation on the benches. Political will must keep the court unchallenged and functional. Moving to the ECOWAS formula, in which positions at the court were packaged with other community appointments for political negotiation,Footnote13 comes at the risk of higher politicisation of the selection process. Instead, the 8-member EAC can still afford to maintain a balanced full representation court. The community’s enlargement further diversified the legal traditions represented in the EAC and decreased the average experience of stable democratic institutions and effective rule of law. Therefore, if the political aim was to emphasise the quality of judges as highly experienced and politically sensitive legal generalists that independently drive the community’s integration agenda, the seats on the benches should not become part of a general bargain. They should rather be a matter of secure allocation to Partner States on the basis of which the quality of judges can be effectively negotiated and cross-checked in the selection and appointment process by, for instance, regional professional bodies such as the East African Law Association (see Kisakye & Stroh, Citation2024). Conversely, keeping the institutional status quo will suit those interested in diminishing the power and influence of supranational institutions, and would severely misalign with the Treaty ambitions.

A similar argument applies to the Secretariat, where the return to the practice of one Deputy Secretary General per member could solve the representation issue. Meanwhile, a reform of the Legislative Assembly appears to be even more ambitious, given that the regional parliament would massively benefit from directly elected assembly members, which in turn would require questioning the overrepresentation of smaller Partner States and to move away from consensus-seeking amongst Partner States. The latter would also imply a reconsideration of decision-making by consensus in the Council and Summit meetings. As the most populous Partner State has a low track record of regular electoral processes and comparatively lower state capacity, the reform of the Court and the Secretariat appear to be the more likely outcome and easier to implement. Meanwhile, a no-reform attitude would likely risk rendering the confederation project meaningless and federation ever more unlikely. Given the community’s cost pressures and the example of intergovernmental ASEAN, the question might arise, why the EAC should maintain costly supranational organs – such as the Court and the Assembly – at all?

Conclusion

Based on the premise that the political ambitions of the EAC Treaty were serious and sincere, this article argues for institutional reforms needed to underpin the Partner States’ commitment. The EAC’s membership reconfiguration requires the reconfirmation of political will. Recent discussions about the institutional implications of rapid enlargement processes in other strongly intergovernmental settings, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (see Liang & Kozinets, Citation2022) or ASEAN, imply that institutional deepening under conditions of organisational widening remains an important concern for practices of regionalism, far beyond the European experience. Strengthening intraregional sovereignty and engagement with a fully intergovernmental path are at risk if there are no institutional adaptations. This will widen the gap between Treaty ambitions and political realities. Unfortunately, severe intra-community security issues drive the EAC away from institutional reforms that strengthen supranationalism and their effective implementation.

Other rapid enlargement processes suggest that widening is not generally detrimental to deepening, but can also provide an opportunity to renegotiate the most appropriate integration process. This seems to hold true for the EAC. If Partner States seek to fulfil the promises of the Treaty, they need to strengthen the supranational institutions of their community and anchor the EAC in the consciousness and interests of its populations through credible commitment. This may include granting more decision-making powers to the most capable states, which can become complicated if some of the largest member states are amongst those with lower state capacity. The EAC has decided to widen in order to deepen the possibilities for peaceful conflict resolution, within and amongst Partner States.

Alexander Stroh is with the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences & Institute of African Studies, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany.