[This is an excerpt from an article in The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies.]

Contemporary China–Zimbabwe relations: an overview

Contemporary China–Zimbabwe relations can be traced back to the 1960s when China was the chief sponsor of one of Zimbabwe’s main liberation movements, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), in its fight against white colonialism and racial oppression (Taylor, Citation2007, p. 106). The People’s Republic of China provided ZANU with much-needed military and strategic assistance (Martin & Johnson, Citation1982), which assisted it in growing into a dominant liberation movement (Taylor, Citation2007, p. 108). What made ZANU turn to China was its failure to get support from the Soviet Union, which preferred the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). China’s split with the Soviet Union also worked to ZANU’s advantage as China became more interested and invested in supporting it against its rival’s beneficiary, ZAPU (Chun, Citation2014, p. 6). Zimbabwe’s military officers were methodically exposed to the Chinese political system and society through the military training they received from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) instructors in China, and at the numerous rear bases in neighbouring countries, such as Tanzania (Mazarire, Citation2017, pp. 87–101).

Again, the Chinese shared their revolutionary ideology and influence with ZANU’s military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) cadres and those of other African countries. This resulted in, among others, the PLA’s military structure being adopted by ZANLA and other liberation movements. As Paul Nantulya (Citation2023, p. 6) notes, ‘The high command included a commander, chief political commissar, chief of staff, functional directors, and regional commanders’. ZANLA’s military strategy was fundamentally transformed from conventional military tactics to the Maoist model, which involved mass mobilisation of the population, primarily owing to Chinese tutelage (Lan, Citation1985, pp. 127–188). There is no doubt that the basis for the present relationship between China and Zimbabwe under the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), even after its leadership change in 2017, was laid during the 1960s when the former supported the latter’s fight for national liberation.

When Zimbabwe officially gained independence in April 1980, Mugabe became Prime Minister after winning an election. According to Zhang Chun (Citation2014, p. 6), Mugabe’s government started ‘as a vaguely social democratic one-party dictatorship and he promptly established official relations with China’. Still, Mugabe only rhetorically referred to socialism. In practice, he accepted and continued Zimbabwe’s integration ‘into the global financial and capitalist system’ (Chun, Citation2014, p. 6). Soon after independence, Mugabe and his government officials travelled to China to thank the country for the support it had rendered for Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Between 1980 and 1999, Zimbabwe’s relations with China remained cordial, even though the close political dealings did not translate into greater economic cooperation. Although China extended some loans to Zimbabwe and was invited to do some construction work, the latter was more inclined to the West, which provided substantial aid (Taylor, Citation2020, pp. 7–8). In fulfilment of their cordial relations, Zimbabwe supported China in the face of the Tiananmen Square controversy in 1989, which dented China’s global image but further strengthened its ties with Zimbabwe (Chun, Citation2014, p. 7). Still, it is noteworthy that in the 1980s China’s major benefactor, North Korea, which had also supported Zimbabwe’s fight for independence from white rule, played an important role in training the notorious Fifth Brigade that Mugabe used to suppress the Matabeleland disturbances (Gukurahundi) (Choi & Jeong, Citation2017). The resultant heinous human rights violations committed by Mugabe and the Fifth Brigade during the Gukurahundi against ZAPU politicians and supporters were wilfully disregarded by Western countries, especially Britain and the United States, based on their Cold War calculations and strategic interests in Zimbabwe (Cameron, Citation2018).

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The relationship between China and Zimbabwe grew stronger after the early 2000s when President Mugabe adopted the ‘Look East Policy’ in the face of economic sanctions imposed by the West. Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform programme, which was accompanied by violence and human rights abuses that also marred elections, prompted Western sanctions (Grebe, Citation2010, pp. 8–10). Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East Policy’ coincided with the establishment of China’s Africa re-engagement policy, the Forum on Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, which further cemented the relationship between the two countries. On its part, FOCAC was created as a ‘platform to cement and expand its[Chinese] political and economic ties with African countries’ (Chun, Citation2014, p. 8). Among other developments, Zimbabwe obtained an array of benefits from China economically and diplomatically (Lahtinen, Citation2018; Wuthnow, Citation2013) while China gained preferential business opportunities and contracts in Zimbabwe, ranging from retail and agriculture to mining (Mhandara & Chipaike, Citation2013, pp. 212–218). China–Zimbabwe relations include military exchanges, which, as shown in the following discussion, go beyond arms transfers to involve human resources and capacity development-related programmes. Chinese military support for Zimbabwe emerges as an essential element of the strong relations between the two countries, with far-reaching consequences for peace, considering that the Zimbabwean military remains a prominent political player (Ndawana, Citation2020).

Chinese military support for Zimbabwe and peacebuilding

Arms and related technology transfers

China is Zimbabwe’s dominant supplier of arms and related technology, which have largely adversely affected peace and governance in the country. Between 2000 and 2018, Zimbabwe acquired over 90% of its military equipment from China (Nantulya, Citation2023, p. 15). For example, in 2004, the Zimbabwean government bought new military equipment from China at a cost of US$240 million. This was delivered in 2006 in two batches (Muleya, Citation2006) and included ‘12 fighter jets and 100 military vehicles’ (Staff Reporter, Citation2004). The ‘new military [K-8] aircraft [was] for training and combat’ (Muleya, Citation2006). In 2011, Zimbabwe imported 20,000 rifles from China (Mariani, Citation2021, p. 20). The same year also saw Zimbabwe receiving ‘21 000 pairs of handcuffs and 12–15 military trucks’ (Chun, Citation2014, p. 13).

The anti-peace, particularly positive peace, consequences of Chinese military support for Zimbabwe have been palpable in the continued transfer of arms to the country, regardless of human rights conditions. Western countries not only stopped extending military assistance and arms sales to the Zimbabwean government. They also imposed sanctions on the country’s ruling elite and top security personnel in an effort to halt human rights violations since the early 2000s (Grebe, Citation2010, pp. 11–12). Chinese military support for Zimbabwe was essentially pro-negative peace and anti-positive peace in that it strengthened the state’s coercive capacity to repress its citizens. For example, in 2005, some civil society groups criticised China’s support for Zimbabwe, noting that it was solely the Chinese who were ready to help ZANU–PF stay in power against the desires of the people. The Chinese support for Zimbabwe at a time when the government was becoming increasingly authoritarian was seen as a result of China’s disregard for democracy and related human rights, and Beijing’s preoccupation with controlling its citizens (Sokwanele Special Report, Citation2005).

Enock Ndawana is with the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, South Africa.