[This is an excerpt from an article in The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies. Opinions expressed do not reflect the position of the Round Table editorial board.]

A unique event took place on 16 August 1995—an independence referendum in one of Britain’s Overseas Territories (BOTs). Since the last significant round of decolonisation that concluded with St Kitts and Nevis in 1983, several territories that constitute the vestiges of the British Empire have toyed with the idea of independence, but only Bermuda has got close. The ‘no’ vote that resulted underlined the complications of using a referendum to bring about significant change and overall, despite frustrations with their relationship, no BOT (including Bermuda) has seriously revisited the issue.

The referendum was held to determine whether Bermuda should become an independent nation or remain a British Dependent Territory (as the BOTs were then known). The result was a decisive rejection of independence, with 74% voting against and only 26% in favour, on a turnout of just under 59%. This outcome marked a pivotal moment in Bermuda’s political history, halting the independence movement and reshaping the island’s political landscape.

Bermuda had flirted with independence in the past but aside from a few government discussion papers it got no further than several opinion polls, all of which showed a solid majority opposed. Bermuda, a British colony since 1684, had developed a prosperous economy based on tourism and offshore finance, making it one of the wealthiest territories in the world on a per capita basis. However, this economic success hid deeper problems, and the 1960s and 1970s saw wide-spread social unrest.

In 1968, race riots caused significant damage, prompting the declaration of a State of Emergency and the deployment of a Royal Navy frigate. In 1972, the Police Commissioner was assassinated and a year later, British Governor Sir Richard Sharples – a former Conservative MP – and his aide-de-camp were murdered. The perpetrators were executed in December 1977, and this triggered widespread rioting and arson. In reply, a Royal Commission of Inquiry was established, chaired by Lord Pitt, a Black British peer. The report advocated for Bermuda’s independence, arguing that for many Black Bermudians, independence represented the final stage in their emancipation (Report of the Royal Commission into the 1977 Disturbances—Bermuda, Citation1978).

Despite Lord Pitt’s advocacy, it took almost two decades for the independence issue to be addressed head-on, and by then it was arguably too late to do the issue justice, with internal political intrigue gaining the upper hand.

Premier John Swan, a Black businessman had led the United Bermuda Party (UBP) through five general elections since becoming premier in 1982. By 1995, after 13 years in power and with the UBP showing signs of internal division and waning public support, Swan saw the referendum as his final opportunity to secure independence. His push for the vote was driven by a belief that Bermuda’s ‘colonial’ status was an affront to equality and that full sovereignty should be asserted. However, his decision to proceed without broad consensus or a clear constitutional roadmap alienated many, including a majority of his MPs. As a result, the party had no official position on the independence question going into the referendum.

To make matters worse, Swan got no help from the opposition Progressive Labour Party (PLP). Backed primarily by Bermuda’s Black majority, it had long advocated for independence. However, when the vote was announced, the PLP made the strategic decision to boycott it. They argued that the process lacked legitimacy and that the form of independence being proposed might entrench existing inequalities. The PLP insisted that independence should only be pursued after comprehensive electoral reform and constitutional changes that would ensure a fairer political system. The boycott was an ultimately successful attempt to weaken the UBP and bare its divisions. Arguably, the campaign was more about the political fate of Premier Swan, than any final chapter of empire.

When to vote and what to vote on: The case for referendums in small states

However, Swan was determined to press ahead and succeeded in passing the preparatory legislation through the House of Assembly. This was only possible because several MPs – though opposed to independence – supported the legislation, arguing that holding the vote was necessary to resolve the issue and allow the country to move forward. Many business leaders also backed a resolution to end the debate, as they were increasingly concerned that ongoing discussions about independence were negatively impacting the economy.

The British government was determined not to influence opinion on the issue and so kept out of the campaign. However, it is interesting to read an ‘Annual Review of 1995’, written by the Governor, Lord Waddington, which was rather critical of the pro-independence faction:

In an attempt to assuage critics, in papers tabled in the House of Assembly, the government said it expected little change in the way Bermuda would be governed if the colony decided to sever ties with Britain: ‘The government does not believe that an independent Bermuda should have a system of government dramatically different from that provided for by the present constitution’ (The Royal Gazette, Citation1995). But this then aligned to the idea of ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’, which became a rallying cry for opponents of independence.

The referendum result was a political blow to Premier Swan, who had staked his leadership on its success. True to his word, he resigned shortly after the vote. His departure marked the end of an era and underscored the political cost of pursuing independence without broad public support. The PLP reiterated its commitment to independence but emphasised that it should follow constitutional reform and greater public engagement. The party’s strategy paid off: in the next general election (1998), the PLP won a clear victory and entered government for the first time in its history; it remained in power until 2012.

So, what were the key lessons from the independence referendum? First, the necessary groundwork was not done to prepare the country for independence. It could be argued that the decision to call a referendum was the last throw of the political dice at the tail end of Premier Swan’s time in power. Second, and relatedly, the UBP waited too long to act. Had the party pursued independence earlier, during a period of greater political strength and unity, the outcome – if not different – would have likely been a narrower defeat and thus giving hope that a future referendum would have resulted in a ‘yes’ vote.

Peter Clegg is Professor of Politics and Dean of the School of Social Sciences at the University of the West of England, Bristol, UK and a member of the Round Table editorial board.